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 SINGAPORE’S LATEST EFFORTS AT REGULATING ONLINE HATE 
SPEECH: A PERSPECTIVE FROM INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
INTERNATIONAL PRACTICES 
 
CHEN SIYUAN* AND CHIA CHEN WEI** 
 
 The introduction of the Protection from Online Falsehoods and 
Manipulation Act (POFMA) has been generating considerable 
debate and feedback. Some of the concerns raised include whether 
the bill unduly restricts the freedom of expression. In focusing on 
the hate speech provisions of the POFMA, this legislation comment 
situates the criticisms within the larger framework of international 
human rights law and international practices and proposes some 




I. SETTING THE CONTEXT 
 
1. The internet may have been around for more than a couple of decades, but governments 
around the world continue to find it a great challenge to regulate online speech in a way 
that strikes an appropriate balance between freedom and security1 and that also accords 
with jurisdictional propriety.2 The latest conundrum presented by the world wide web 
is supposedly that of “fake news”, which is claimed to have the potential of disrupting 
society by sowing discord and division between groups, influencing political outcomes, 
legitimising fringe views, and discrediting establishment journalism.3 Given the nature 
of the internet, the spreading of “fake news” is not confined to persons within a single 
jurisdiction, and can include persons from other jurisdictions and even bots, through 
coordinated means or otherwise.  
 
2. In other countries, responses by governments to this phenomenon have ranged from 
proposed fines4 and imprisonment5 to actual shutdowns of internet services.6 In 
                                                 
* LLB (First Class Hons) (National University of Singapore), LLM (Harvard); Associate Professor, Singapore 
Management University. Contact: siyuanchen@smu.edu.sg 
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1 See generally UN Human Rights Council, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection 
of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression”, UN Doc A/HRC/38/35 (2018). 
2 See generally Chia Chen Wei, “Sketching the Margins of a Borderless World” (2018) 30(3) Singapore Academy 
of Law Journal 833. 
3 See generally Cherilyn Ireton and Julie Posetti, Journalism, Fake News & Disinformation (UNESCO: 2018). 
4 See for instance BBC, “Websites to be Fined Over “Online Harms” Under New Proposals” (8 April 2019): 
https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/sri-lanka-social-media-shutdown-raises-fears-on-free-expression-
11469136. 
5 See for instance Saudi Gazette, “5-Year Jail, SR3m Fine for Social Media Material that Disrupt Public Order” 
(9 May 2018): http://saudigazette.com.sa/article/542723/SAUDI-ARABIA/5-year-jail-SR3m-fine-for-social-
media-material-that-disrupt-public-order. 
6 See for instance CNA, “Sri Lanka Social Media Shutdown Raises Fears on Free Expression” (23 April 2019): 
https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/sri-lanka-social-media-shutdown-raises-fears-on-free-expression-
11469136. 
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Singapore, we have the recent introduction of the Protection from Online Falsehoods 
and Manipulation Act (now popularly known as POFMA),7 a fairly substantial piece of 
legislation that comprises 62 sections.8 The POFMA has been generating considerable 
debate and feedback since it was first mooted in 2017, be it in the form of the protracted 
Select Committee hearings on Deliberate Online Falsehoods,9 the Green Paper on 
Deliberate Online Falsehoods,10 or the public consultations that have ensued after the 
First Reading of the bill.11 International groups such as the International Commission 
of Jurists,12 Reporters Sans Frontiers,13 and Human Rights Watch14 have also weighed 
in on the matter, claiming that the law would unduly suppress speech and possibly be 
abused by the government.  
 
3. The objective of this legislation comment is threefold: first, to identify and analyse 
some of the issues presented by the critical provisions of the POFMA, with a particular 
focus on the online hate speech provisions; secondly, to situate these hate speech 
provisions within the framework of both international law and international practices; 
and thirdly, to make some brief recommendations on how else the law can be improved. 
To be clear, the POFMA’s ambit extends beyond online hate speech, but those areas 
will not form the focus on this comment due to space constraints.  
 
II. EXAMINING THE POFMA PROVISIONS AND IDENTIFYING SOME OF 
THE POSSIBLE CRITICISMS 
 
4. We begin our analysis by examining the salient POFMA provisions that pertain to 
online hate speech, before setting out some of the potential issues: 
 
a. Under section 7(1), a person must not do any act in or outside Singapore to 
communicate15 a statement knowing or having reason to believe16 that it is a 
false statement of fact, and the communication of that statement is likely to, 
                                                 
7 10/2019. 
8 The government has also stated that efforts in improving media and information literacy and promoting fact-
checking would be taken as well: The Straits Times, “Parliament: Law Against Online Falsehoods Will Not Stifle 
Free Speech, Say Ministers” (1 April 2019): https://www.straitstimes.com/politics/parliament-law-against-online-
falsehoods-will-not-stifle-speech-ministers. Indeed, simply developing an appetite for longform debates would go 
some way in neutralising simplified soundbites on, say, power structures and identity politics that seed the ground 
for online hate speech.   
9 The result was a 317-page report: 13th Parliament of Singapore, “Report of the Select Committee on Deliberate 
Online Falsehoods”, Parl 15 of 2018. 
10 Misc 10 of 2018. 
11 See also Ministry of Law, “New Bill to Protect Society from Online Falsehoods and Malicious Actors” (1 April 
2019): https://www.mlaw.gov.sg/content/minlaw/en/news/press-releases/New-Bill-to-Protect-society-from-
Online-Falsehoods-and-Malicious-Actors.html. 
12 International Commission of Jurists, “Singapore: ICJ Calls on Government Not to Adopt Online Regulation 
Bill in Current Form” (12 April 2019): https://www.icj.org/singapore-icj-calls-on-government-not-to-adopt-
online-regulation-bill-in-current-form/. 
13 Reports Without Borders, “RSF Explains Why Singapore’s Anti-Fake News Bill is Terrible” (8 April 2019): 
https://rsf.org/en/news/rsf-explains-why-singapores-anti-fake-news-bill-terrible. 
14 Human Rights Watch, “Singapore: Reject Sweeping “Fake News” Bill” (3 April 2019): 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/04/03/singapore-reject-sweeping-fake-news-bill. 
15 This is defined in section 3(2) as a statement that is made available to one or more end-users in Singapore on 
or through the internet, MMS, or SMS. 
16 Cf Sui Yi Siong et al, “Written Representation 130 to the Select Committee” (7 March 2018) at para 7. 
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inter alia, prejudice national security,17 public health, public safety, or public 
tranquillity, or incite feelings of enmity, hatred, or ill-will between different 
groups of persons.18 As we will soon make clear and define, the latter half of 
this provision (especially the part on incitement of feelings) essentially refers to 
the consequence of hate speech, while the former half refers to the act that 
causes it (a false statement of fact).19 
 
b. Under section 7(2), a person guilty of section 7(1) shall be fined not exceeding 
$50,000 or be imprisoned for a term not exceeding 5 years, or both. If the person 
had used an inauthentic online account or a bot to commit the offence, he shall 
be fined not exceeding $100,00 or be imprisoned for a term not exceeding 10 
years, or both. 
 
c. Under sections 10, 11, and 12, a minister may order a correction direction or a 
stop communication direction if a false statement of fact has been 
communicated in Singapore and the minister is of the opinion that it is in the 
public interest to issue the direction. “In the public interest” is defined non-
exhaustively in section 4, and the definition that is of relevance here is the doing 
of something that is necessary or expedient: in the interest of the security of 
Singapore; to protect public health, public safety, or public tranquillity; or to 
prevent incitement of feelings of enmity, hatred, or ill-will between different 
groups of persons. 
 
d. Under section 15, a person who fails to comply with an order made under 
sections 11 or 12 without reasonable excuse shall be fined not exceeding 
$20,000 or be imprisoned for a term not exceeding 12 months, or both. 
 
e. Under sections 17 and 19, a person subject to an order made under sections 11 
or 12 may appeal to the High Court after he has applied to the minister to vary 
or cancel the order, and the minister has refused the application in whole or in 
part.20 
 
f. Under sections 20, 21, 22, and 23, a minister may order an internet intermediary 
to make a general correction, make a targeted correction, or disable access if a 
false statement of fact has been communicated in Singapore and the minister is 
of the opinion that it is in the public interest to issue the direction.21 
 
                                                 
17 Cf section 3(1)(e) of the Sedition Act (Cap 290, 2013 Rev Ed): “A seditious tendency is a tendency … to 
promote feelings of ill-will and hostility between different races or classes of the population of Singapore.” 
18 Cf section 8(1)(a) of the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act (Cap 167A, 2001 Rev Ed): “The Minister may 
make a restraining order … where the Minister is satisfied that that person has committed or is attempting to 
commit … acts … causing feelings of enmity, hatred, ill-will or hostility between different religious groups”. 
19 In recent times, the link between the two has manifested in its most violent form in debates on immigration 
policy and refugee policy: UN Human Rights Council, “Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding 
Mission on Myanmar”, UN Doc A/HRC/39/64 (2018). 
20 See also Siraj Omar, “Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Bill: A More Calibrated Approach”, 
The Straits Times (1 May 2019): “[The POFMA] does not provide a deadline within which the minister must 
decide. This should be expressly set out in subsidiary legislation (as is usually the case), and should ideally be 
kept short so as to enable the aggrieved person to have recourse to the courts without undue delay.” The Ministry 
of Law later said it would consider this suggestion: K Shanmugam, “NMPs Agree on Major Points of Falsehoods 
Bill”, The Straits Times (3 May 2019). 
21 See also the government powers under the Broadcasting Act (Cap 28, 2012 Rev Ed). 
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g. Under section 27, a person who fails to comply with an order made under 
sections 21, 22, or 23 without reasonable excuse shall be fined not exceeding 
$20,000 or imprisoned for a term not exceeding 12 months, or both; in any other 
case, the fine shall not exceed $1 million. 
 
h. Under section 29, a person subject to an order under sections 21, 22, or 23 may 
appeal to the High Court after he has applied to the minister to vary or cancel 
the order, and the minister has refused the application in whole or in part. 
 
i. Under section 57, any offence under the statute may be compounded, while 
under section 61, the minister may exempt any person or class of persons from 
any provision of the statute. 
 
5. Before going further, it is important to note that the Explanatory Statement and 
Preamble of the POFMA explicitly state the various purposes22 of the legislation. What 
is of relevance here are the stated aims of preventing the electronic communication of 
false statements of fact and information manipulation as well as the enabling of 
measures to counteract the effects of such communication.23 The Ministry of Law has 
also clarified that: the bill targets falsehoods and not opinions, criticisms, satires, and 
parodies; the primary remedial measure would be corrections, and not removal or 
takedown of content; criminal offences would apply only to malicious actors seeking 
to undermine society; and any decision by the government over what is false can be 
overridden by the courts on appeal.24 These positions were reiterated in Parliament 
during the debate over the bill.25 
 
6. What then are some of the issues that arise from the provisions that have been set out 
above? Here, we identify no less than four issues that have been raised by various 
parties; these also correspond to the chief concerns that were raised in Parliament during 
the debate over the legislation.26 The first and perhaps most obvious one is that 
concerning definitions, the chief example of which is what constitutes a “false statement 
of fact” under section 7. Section 7 does not define the phrase,27 but the definitional 
clause (section 2) does clarify that the determination of a statement of fact is based on 
a “reasonable person” analysis and that false statements would include partly or wholly 
                                                 
22 It is trite law in Singapore that the purposive interpretation trumps all other canons of statutory interpretation: 
section 9A of the Interpretation Act (Cap 1, 2002 Rev Ed).  
23 See also The Straits Times, “PM Lee Hsien Loong: Legislation Essential to Curbing Spread of Fake News” (26 
April 2019): https://www.straitstimes.com/politics/pm-legislation-essential-to-curbing-spread-of-fake-news, 
where it was suggested that the POFMA can be applied in a preventive way that focuses on the intent to do harm, 
without harm necessarily materialising. 
24 Ministry of Law, “New Bill to Protect Society from Online Falsehoods and Malicious Actors” (1 April 2019): 
https://www.mlaw.gov.sg/content/minlaw/en/news/press-releases/New-Bill-to-Protect-society-from-Online-
Falsehoods-and-Malicious-Actors.html. See also The Straits Times, “No Need to be Overly Worried about Fake 
News Laws, Says Ong Ye Kung” (29 April 2019): https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/no-need-to-be-overly-
worried-about-fake-news-laws-says-ong. 
25 Singapore Parliament Debates, 8 May 2019. 
26 The Straits Times, “Parliament: Shanmugam Addresses 5 Concerns Over Proposed Fake News Law” (8 May 
2019): https://www.straitstimes.com/politics/parliament-law-minister-shanmugam-addresses-five-concerns-
over-proposed-fake-news-law. 
27 Indeed, the ambiguities present in the POFMA extends even to terms that have been defined – “in the public 
interest” being the prominent example – the definition seems circular when we compare the language between 
sections 4 and 10 (or 11, 12, 20, 21, 22, and 23 for the matter). 
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misleading statements.28 Notwithstanding this attempt at disambiguation, it is not 
always easy to distinguish between facts and opinions, characterisations, and 
misimpressions that result from decontextualisation.29  
 
7. To illustrate, when a fatal riot broke out in Charlottesville during the Unite the Right 
rally, President Donald Trump was deemed by his political opponents to have 
committed hate speech by supporting white supremacists when he said that “You had 
some very bad people in the group … But you also had people that were very fine 
people, on both sides”.30 Given the context of the rally – in that contrary to the media’s 
characterisation, many who protested the removal of Confederate monuments were not 
necessarily “alt-right fascists” – the President’s words could be interpreted a number of 
ways (and even as a fact), but this opinion (of his support for neo-Nazis) has since been 
presented as fact, for instance, by various Democratic presidential candidates for the 
2020 campaign.31  
 
8. Even scientific claims, which are supposed to be independent of political ideologies, 
are not spared of this uncertainty. Consider the example of biological sex and gender. 
From a neuroscience perspective, there is now growing evidence that there are generally 
differences between male and female brains that account for, say, dissimilarities in 
behaviour, cognitive functions, and rates of mental disorders.32 However, academic 
studies looking to investigate these differences have readily been condemned by 
postmodernists and intersectionalists for downplaying the existence of structural 
inequalities and worse, as factual non-starters, misogynistic, and hateful.33 This may 
sound like caricature, but it is not, and even supposed leading institutions like 
Cambridge University have fallen prey to this line of thinking.34 
 
9. The illustrations we have cited highlight the importance of needing the POFMA to 
strike the right balance between allowing internet discourse on matters of public interest 
to flourish (maybe accepting that mistakes on the facts necessarily have to be made 
before a consensus can be reached) and ensuring that misunderstandings that lead to 
hate speech and possibly violence are minimised.35 This brings us to the second issue, 
which concerns the allocation of powers in the fact-determination process. The POFMA 
leaves no doubt that it is the government (minister) who determines whether a false 
                                                 
28 Though in a different context, article 16 of the General Data Protection Regulation (2019) Directive 95/46/EC 
has shown that the concept of incomplete accounts of information is difficult to ascertain and adjudicate upon. 
29 See for instance Salov v Ukraine App No 65518/01 (ECtHR, 6 September 2005) at para 113. 
30 ABC News, “Trump Said “Blame on Both Sides” in Charlottesville, Now the Anniversary Puts Him on the 
Spot” (12 August 2018): https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-blame-sides-charlottesville-now-anniversary-
puts-spot/story?id=57141612. 
31 See for instance YouTube, “Joe Biden for President” (25 April 2019): 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VbOU2fTg6cI. One could, of course, attempt to justify Biden’s speech as 
political and therefore more deserving of protection (see for instance Stankov and the United Macedonian 
Organisation Ilinden v Bulgaria App nos 29221/95, 29225/95 (ECtHR, 2 October 2001) at para 102), but that 
notion does not have universal acceptance – not least in Singapore laws, including the POFMA. 
32 Stanford Medicine, “Two Minds” (2017): https://stanmed.stanford.edu/2017spring/how-mens-and-womens-
brains-are-different.html. 
33 Quillette, “Denying the Neuroscience of Sex Differences” (29 March 2019): 
https://quillette.com/2019/03/29/denying-the-neuroscience-of-sex-differences/. 
34 Quillette, “Cambridge Capitulates to the Mob and Fires a Young Scholar” (2 May 2019): 
https://quillette.com/2019/05/02/cambridge-capitulates-to-the-mob-and-fires-a-young-scholar/. 
35 Cf Siraj Omar, “Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Bill: A More Calibrated Approach”, The 
Straits Times (1 May 2019). 
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statement of fact has been made, and whether it is in the public interest to order 
correction or stop directions, general or targeted corrections, or disabling of access. But 
when it comes to online hate speech regulation, are there superior alternatives?  
 
10. The usual rejoinder to letting the government decide is to let either the intermediary or 
the online community self-regulate, though often it is a combination of both. For 
instance, Facebook and Twitter have in place user term agreements and community 
standards, reporting and flagging mechanisms, moderators, algorithmic filters, and 
inhouse legal teams to track potential hate speech – in many jurisdictions, they seldom 
wait for a government order before acting (to remove the post, suspend the user, and so 
forth).36  
 
11. The problem though is their abject lack of transparency whenever intermediaries 
moderate content or suspend or ban accounts, leading some to conclude that 
intermediaries have the proclivity to censor based on their own political ideologies, 
often seeing no difference between facts and hate speech – Facebook and Twitter are 
routinely accused of considering contentious social issues like abortion and 
transgenderism as not up for debate (even when factual claims are made) because of 
the supposed potential for generating hate speech, but there are neither appeal 
mechanisms nor reasons given when they limit or block such speech.37 Seen in this 
light, putting aside the difficulty of determining what is hate speech, maybe it is actually 
more democratic and accountable for the government, rather than intermediaries, to 
make the call on when the freedom of expression should be limited. We should add 
briefly that having the courts make the call is not a viable alternative, for reasons that 
the government have highlighted during the debate: courts are not designed to act 
quickly, both in terms of getting a hearing date and allowing the full presentation of 
evidence in adversarial system of law.38 
 
12. But even if one accepts that the government is best placed to make the call on whether 
something qualifies as hate speech, something might be said about the obstacles to 
challenging the government’s decision. Once the minister decides that directions, 
corrections, or disablement are appropriate, these potentially draconian orders then 
must be complied with until an application to vary or cancel them succeeds, or 
potentially heavy sanctions could follow (this is elaborated in the next issue). Further, 
though the minister’s decision to refuse variation or cancellation is appealable to the 
courts, this necessarily involves litigation, which entails time, resources, and costs,39 
though it was clarified in Parliament that the appeal process will be simple (no court 
fees for the first three days) and fast (as little as nine days for the court to hear the 
case).40  
                                                 
36 This will be elaborated in the next section. 
37 USA Today, “Is Facebook Too Liberal?” (3 May 2018): 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2018/05/03/facebook-pledges-investigate-charges-bias-against-
conservatives/574505002/; CNBC, “Why Silicon Valley Tech Giants Can’t Shake Accusations of 
Anticonservative Political Bias” (17 October 2018): https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/17/why-silicon-valley-cant-
shake-accusations-of-anticonservative-bias.html. 
38 See Singapore Parliament Debates, 8 May 2019. 
39 See also Siraj Omar, “Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Bill: A More Calibrated Approach”, 
The Straits Times (1 May 2019). There is, of course, also uncertainty as to how the courts will respond to such 
applications.  
40 The Straits Times, “Appeal Process Under Fake News Law Will Be Simple, Fast” (8 May 2019): 
https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/appeal-process-under-fake-news-law-will-be-simple-fast-shanmugam. 
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 13. One could of course rationalise this on the basis that hate speech is irredeemably bad 
for society, and so it stands to reason to make it hard for the maker of the speech or the 
intermediary hosting the speech to challenge the government’s decision; further, as 
much as the government is responsible for upholding rights, it also has the 
responsibility to protect competing rights, such as the safety and security of vulnerable 
groups. Yet this presupposes that –  apart from its ease of determination – such speech 
has no inherent value whatsoever, and the best remedy is governmental intervention. In 
the final analysis though, once it is accepted that the government is better to place to 
determine the legality of content, there would invariably be transactional costs involved 
to challenge it. How these costs can be meaningfully managed may well go beyond the 
issue of costs of litigation in this specific context, but the relatively high costs of 
litigation in Singapore in general.  
 
14. The last issue we have identified is the proportionality of the consequences once the 
minister has decided that there is hate speech. Directions to stop and orders to disable 
access are not extraordinary and are indeed logical responses once one accepts that hate 
speech warrants legislative and executive action, but corrections might be tricky to 
implement. For individuals, the maker of the statement is expected to declare that his 
statement is false and point to where the truth is to be found on terms to be decided by 
the government. For intermediaries, by virtue of them being passive entities even 
though they are often passive entities that do not generate (but sometimes can control) 
user content, they have to communicate corrections on terms to be decided by the 
government. Because it is the government that decides the extent of corrections 
required, for the reasons stated above, this might be preferable to letting the 
intermediaries decide.  
 
15. Having said that, in the context of hate speech, it seems unlikely in most cases that the 
government would opt for corrections – stop or disablement orders would more likely 
be preferred.41 One would also imagine that in Singapore, hate speech, especially that 
pertaining to race or religion, is a presumptively egregious offence.42 A person found 
guilty of such speech could be fined up to $50,000 and imprisoned for up to 5 years; if 
he refuses to abide by any government order to stop or modify his statement, he could 
be subject to further sanctions in the form of a fine up to $20,000 and imprisonment of 
up to 12 months. The fining of an intermediary of up to $1 million may not seem much 
if we have in mind the revenues of social media giants such as Facebook and Twitter, 
but this amount is for each breach and not a global cap.  
 
16. All things considered, it seems there is, at multiple junctures, a perceptible potential for 
chilling speech and self-censorship, but as earlier stated, the purpose of this comment 
is to compare the POFMA with international norms, or at least those that are 
identifiable. This give us a better idea as to whether the POFMA under- or over-
regulates what has clearly become a societal menace, and also provides some yardsticks 
on what the best practices could be in combatting online hate speech – after all, the 
                                                 
41 Even then, this potentially places intermediaries that operate in multiple jurisdictions between a rock and a hard 
place – while the POFMA requires them to comply with directions as there is no defence of duty under law, other 
jurisdictions may sanction them for unduly restricting the freedom of expression of the person who posted the 
content. 
42 See section 3(1)(e) of the Sedition Act (Cap 290, 2013 Rev Ed); section 8(1)(a) of the Maintenance of Religious 
Harmony Act (Cap 167A, 2001 Rev Ed) (both of which have been set out earlier). 
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validity of any criticism of the POFMA is best seen in the light of international human 
rights law and practices, for any other point of reference would not have the same 
pedigree of international consensus. Additionally, the view that effective internet 
governance requires intergovernmental collaboration in formulating harmonised rules 
is increasingly gaining traction.43 It is perhaps for these reasons that the Ministry of 
Law was minded to include an annex on international developments when introducing 
the POFMA,44 as was the Select Committee in its report.45 With all that said, how does 
the POFMA hold up under international legal scrutiny?  
 
III. THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK FOR 
REGULATING ONLINE HATE SPEECH 
 
17. Any discourse on international human rights, especially where speech is concerned, 
must invariably begin with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR)46 – the preeminent multilateral human rights treaty47 that has been ratified by 
more than 170 of the 193 UN Member States (more will be said soon about Singapore 
not being a state party). What must be observed at the outset is that although the 
freedom of expression is one of the fundamental rights protected by the covenant, this 
freedom48 is not absolute and can be limited by states.49 Article 19(3) of the ICCPR 
permits the restriction of the freedom of expression on the grounds of respect of the 
rights or reputations of others or the protection of national security, public order, public 
health, or morals.50 The same provision states, however, that states in interfering with 
this right must show that any such restriction is provided by law and is necessary; while 
the threshold for prescription by law is low and gives states some latitude to frame laws 
broadly, the element of necessity requires the pursuit of a legitimate aim, the existence 
of a pressing social need, and a proportionate response that has no less restrictive 
alternatives (the three-part test).51  
 
                                                 
43 See for instance UN, “Global Cooperation and Regulation Key in Addressing Multi-layered Threats Posed by 
New Technology” (14 November 2018): https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2018/11/global-
cooperation-and-regulation-key-in-addressing-multilayered-threats-posed-by-new-technology/. 
44 Ministry of Law, “New Bill to Protect Society from Online Falsehoods and Malicious Actors” (1 April 2019): 
https://www.mlaw.gov.sg/content/minlaw/en/news/press-releases/New-Bill-to-Protect-society-from-Online-
Falsehoods-and-Malicious-Actors.html. 
45 13th Parliament of Singapore, “Report of the Select Committee on Deliberate Online Falsehoods”, Parl 15 of 
2018 at Annexes A–F. 
46 999 UNTS 171 (entry into force 23 March 1976).  
47 The International Bill of Rights comprises the ICCPR, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, 993 UNTS 3 (entry into force 3 January 1976) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
10 December 1948, 217A(III).  
48 Article 19(2) states that everyone “shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom 
to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or 
in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.” 
49 Cf article 19(1), which states that everyone “shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.” 
50 Article 18(3), which pertains to the contiguous right of freedom of religion, similarly restricts religious 
expressions that might cause harm to public safety, order, health, morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms 
of others. See also principle 6 of The Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression and 
Access to Information (1995): “expression may be punished as a threat to national security only if a government 
can demonstrate that: (a) the expression is intended to incite imminent violence; (b) it is likely to incite such 
violence; and (c) there is a direct and immediate connection between the expression and the likelihood or 
occurrence of such violence.” 
51 This has been the unanimous position across all international human rights bodies, be it the UN (see for instance 
Corinna Horvath v Australia UN Doc CCPR/C/110/D/1885/2009 (HRC, 27 March 2014) at para 3.11), the 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3392146 
18. Then there is article 20(2), which unlike article 19 that requires the state to protect the 
freedom of expression, requires the state to prohibit certain kinds of speech. 
Specifically, it obligates states to prohibit speech that advocates national, racial, or 
religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility, or violence.52 
This has been referred to by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and various 
UN Special Rapporteurs as the hate speech prohibition, and has been confirmed to 
apply to online speech as well.53  
 
19. In determining whether there is hate speech, factors to be considered include the context 
in which the speech was made, the status of the maker of the speech, the intent of the 
maker, the content and form of the speech, the reach of the speech, and the likelihood 
and imminence of harm (inchoate acts are therefore included).54 Although it has been 
said that any restrictions should only be imposed on “the most severe and deeply felt 
form of opprobrium”55 and must also fulfil the aforementioned prescription and 
necessity requirements,56 it is widely accepted that the ICCPR conception of the limits 
on freedom of expression is different from, say, the US conception, which sets the high 
watermark for permissible speech.57 Recent UN bodies have even claimed that the 
approach towards online hate speech should be “zero tolerance”, in unequivocal 
opposition to any ideal of relying heavily on the marketplace of ideas to counteract hate 
speech.58 
 
20. Operating in the backdrop is the doctrine of margin of appreciation or margin of 
discretion, which claims that because national authorities are best placed to balance 
conflicting fundamental human rights based on each state’s unique social context and 
                                                 
Strasbourg court (see for instance Avram v Moldova App no 41588/05 (ECtHR, 5 July 2011) at para 24), the Inter-
American court (see for instance Tristán Donoso v Panama, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and 
Costs Judgment (IACtHR, 27 January 2009) at para 56), or the African Human Rights court (see for instance 
Interights v Mauritania AHRLR 87 Comm no 242/2001 (ACommHPR, 2004) at paras 78–79). See also UN 
Human Rights Committee, “General Comment 34” (12 September 2011) UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/34 at paras 22–
34. 
52 See also article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
660 UNTS 195 (entry into force 4 January 1969): “States Parties condemn all propaganda and all organisations 
which are based on ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of persons of one colour or ethnic origin, 
or which attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination in any form, and undertake to adopt 
immediate and positive measures designed to eradicate all incitement to, or acts of, such discrimination”.   
53 UN Human Rights Council, “Rabat Plan of Action on the Prohibition of Advocacy of National, Racial or 
Religious Hatred That Constitutes Incitement to Discrimination, Hostility or Violence”, UN Doc 
A/HRC/22/17/Add 4 (2013) at para 29. 
54  UN Human Rights Council, “Rabat Plan of Action on the Prohibition of Advocacy of National, Racial or 
Religious Hatred That Constitutes Incitement to Discrimination, Hostility or Violence”, UN Doc 
A/HRC/22/17/Add 4 (2013) at para 29. 
55  UN Human Rights Council, “Rabat Plan of Action on the Prohibition of Advocacy of National, Racial or 
Religious Hatred That Constitutes Incitement to Discrimination, Hostility or Violence”, UN Doc 
A/HRC/22/17/Add 4 (2013) at para 29. 
56 UN Human Rights Council, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to 
Freedom of Opinion and Expression”, UN Doc A/HRC/38/35 (2018) at para 8. 
57 This has been the case since the SCOTUS decision interpreting the Amendment I of the Constitution of the US 
in Brandenburg v Ohio, 395 US 444 (1969), which held that the mere advocacy is not enough to constitute hate 
speech; there must be circumstances that create a clear and present danger that will bring about substantive evils 
that the government has a right to prevent. This decision has not been altered in spite of developments in internet 
speech.  
58 See for instance UN, “Third Committee Experts Warn Racism, Hate Speech, White Supremacy to Become 
Mainstream Unless States Enforce Zero-Tolerance Policies, Prevent Exclusion” (29 October 2018): 
https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/gashc4245.doc.htm. 
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circumstances, there is no one-size-fits-all solution when assessing the justifiability of 
interferences with human rights. However, there are obstacles to concluding that this 
doctrine enjoys unqualified universal support.  
 
21. For instance, while the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has consistently 
affirmed it over decades of its jurisprudence,59 the UN body which monitors the 
implementation of the ICCPR has been more tentative in its embracement,60 as has 
numerous UN Special Rapporteurs.61 From this standpoint, any invocation of the 
margin of appreciation outside the context of the European Convention on Human 
Rights62 should, in principle at least, be done with some caution.63 Instead, absent 
customary international law to the contrary, the text of the ICCPR should remain the 
first port of call when determining the scope of the freedom of expression, the 
interpretation of which is of course guided by the rules of treaty interpretation set out 
in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.64 
 
22. The above establishes the contours for regulating freedom of expression in general. 
Things become considerably trickier when internet websites enter the framework. For 
a start, the ICCPR was originally conceived to regulate affairs between the state and its 
people rather than the state and media entities, let alone intermediaries such as social 
media websites, the chief purveyors of virulent content;65 further, before the advent of 
the internet, the freedom of expression was largely exercised on platforms 
fundamentally different from the most popular types of media today in terms of barriers 
to entry, costs, editorial intervention, speed of dissemination, reach, the potential for 
virality, privacy and anonymity, and the likelihood of fabrication and 
decontextualisation.66  
 
23. The nett result is that in the context of speech made on the internet, it becomes unclear 
who should be responsible for content regulation such as the curbing of hate speech – 
is it still the state, as was the case before online freedom of expression was possible, or 
do internet websites, and in particular social media companies, now bear the main 
responsibility? And even if the allocation of responsibility can be determined, as we 
have alluded to above, what exactly should be done to remedy the breach, and what 
consequences should follow if the breach is not remedied? 
 
                                                 
59 See for instance Palomo Sánchez v Spain App nos 28955/06, 28957/06, 28959/06, 28964/06 (ECtHR, 12 
September 2011) at para 54; Bédat v Switzerland App no 56925/08 (ECtHR, 29 March 2016) at para 54. 
60 See for instance Ilmari Länsman v Finland UN Doc CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992 (HRC, 14 October 1993) at para 
9.4. 
61 See for instance UN Human Rights Council, “Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion 
and Expression”, UN Doc A/71/150 (2016). 
62 ETS 5 (4 November 1950). Having said that, there is no material difference between article 19 of the ICCPR 
and its equivalent in the ECHR in terms of the grounds in which the freedom of expression may be limited. 
63 The European cases that have consistently upheld that speech that offends and shocks the conscience is 
permissible (see for instance Sürek v Turkey App no 23927/94 (ECtHR, 8 July 1999) at para 58), should, likewise, 
be treated with some caution. 
64 1155 UNTS 331 (entry into force 27 January 1980). Typical canons of interpretation, as set out in article 31, 
include the interpretation of good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the words in their context and 
in the light of the relevant treaty’s object and purpose. 
65 See UN Human Rights Council, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right 
to Freedom of Opinion and Expression”, UN Doc A/HRC/32/38 (2016) at para 9. 
66 See Iginio Gagliardone et al, Countering Online Hate Speech (UNESCO: 2015) at pp 13–15. 
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24. In this regard, we can look at how online hate speech and intermediaries have been 
regulated in various parts of the world. It used to be the case that the importance of self-
regulation, as well as the need to avoid broad and sweeping restrictions on internet 
content, were acknowledged almost universally – by the UN Special Rapporteur on 
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe, the Organisation for American States, the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, to name but a few regional and international bodies.67  
 
25. It also used to be the case that there was near-universal recognition that because the 
internet has become the principal means by which people exercise their freedom of 
expression, attempts to restrict online speech on matters of public interest should be 
condemned.68 Because of this, the default position in many jurisdictions was that even 
though they often had billions in revenue, the responsibilities imposed on 
intermediaries were either unarticulated or minimal, and speech (including hate speech) 
could only be lawfully restricted upon the issuance of a court order or executive order 
from the authorities.69  
 
26. Complementing this was the intermediaries’ repeated assurances that less restrictive 
alternatives of speech regulation worked more effectively to curtail hate speech – apart 
from the aforementioned user term agreements and community standards, reporting and 
flagging mechanisms, moderators, and algorithmic filters to put them on notice of 
problematic content, in more extreme cases intermediaries could also limit access, 
suspend accounts, block accounts, demonetise accounts, remove posts, or reduce the 
visibility of trending posts.70 Indeed, apart from copyright infringement and child 
pornography – for which both can be detected with success rates with the right software 
– there was no expectation that intermediaries had to do much with respect to content 
regulation.71 
 
27. However, giving intermediaries a free pass is no longer the state of affairs. The ECtHR, 
for instance, now applies various factors for the determination of intermediary liability 
when an intermediary is perceived to be ineffectual and inefficient in policing content 
amounting to hate speech.72 While the court recognises that value judgments, opinions, 
potentially defamatory speech, and crude expressions with a low register of style are 
still permissible, where an intermediary allows for content amounting to “manifest 
expressions of hatred” to remain on its platform, it would be held accountable for being 
                                                 
67 See OSCE, “Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and the Internet” (1 June 2011): 
https://www.osce.org/fom/78309. 
68 UN Human Rights Council, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to 
Freedom of Opinion and Expression” UN Doc A/HRC/17/27 (2011) at para 58. 
69 UN Human Rights Council, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to 
Freedom of Opinion and Expression” UN Doc A/HRC/17/27 (2011) at para 43; Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, “Freedom of Expression and the Internet” OEA/SER L/II CIDH/RELE/INF 11/13 (2013) at para 
138. 
70 See generally Rebecca MacKinnon et al, Fostering Freedom Online (UNESCO: 2014); UN Human Rights 
Council, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on Minority Issues” UN Doc A/HRC/28/64 (2015). 
71 See generally Daphne Keller, “Internet Platforms” (2018) Hoover Institution Aegis Series Paper No 1807.  
72 See for instance Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete and Index.hu Zrt v Hungary App no 22947/13 
(ECtHR, 2 May 2016) at para 69. The factors include the context of the comments, the measures applied by the 
intermediary company to prevent or remove defamatory comments, the liability of the actual authors of the 
comments as an alternative to the intermediary’s liability, and the consequences of the domestic proceedings for 
the applicant company. For the (similar) position under the European Court of Justice, see Google France, Google 
Inc v Louis Vuitton Malletier SA C-236/08 (CJEU, 23 March 2010) at para 120. 
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asleep at the wheel, especially if it has the means to determine the legality of posts.73 
In part, this was a rebuke to the notion that the marketplace of ideas would work well 
enough on the internet, especially since intermediaries are often guilty of perpetuating 
echo chambers by controlling the content that users interact with based on the users’ 
political preferences – any previously held assumptions about counter-narratives 
neutralising bad speech were thus shattered.74 
 
28. At first, intermediaries resisted taking on this responsibility in monitoring content. The 
claim was that there was too much content on social media to monitor, and it was 
unreasonable to impose any duty to regulate when they had neither creative nor editorial 
oversight for information that could be published by anyone at anytime and anywhere 
– not to mention the perennial issue of the difficulty in determining hate speech in 
different contexts.75 Facebook, for instance, continually insisted for years that it was 
ill-placed to tackle the problem of fake news facilitating hate speech being shared on 
its platform before grudgingly accepting that it had to implement measures to fact-
check news articles – only to be accused of introducing political bias into such checks.76 
For Twitter, it was only in late-2018 that it revised its hate speech policy,77 while 
YouTube continues to be criticised for not being proactive enough in taking down 
videos that encourage or depict racial and religious violence.78 But increasing waves of 
national legislation have followed the ECtHR’s lead, even enhancing the burden that is 
to be placed on intermediaries.  
 
29. The most notable example is probably Germany, which has grappled with immigrant 
and refugee assimilation in recent years. It passed the notorious Network Enforcement 
Act in 2017. Under that law, absent any specific agreement with law enforcement 
authorities, social network intermediaries are to remove “manifestly unlawful” content 
within 24 hours of receiving a user complaint, as opposed to executive or judicial 
notice; this time period is only extended to 7 days for unlawful content that is not 
“manifestly unlawful”.79 Within this framework, intermediaries are expected to consult 
their own lawyers in determining whether something would count as illegal hate speech 
and the swiftness of the takedown required – failure to comply with the law may lead 
                                                 
73 Delfi AS v Estonia App no 64569/09 (ECtHR, 16 June 2015) at paras 142–156. In that case, the contents in 
question were left online for no less than six weeks. See also OSCE, “Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression 
and “Fake News”, Disinformation and Propaganda”, (3 March 2017): https://www.osce.org/fom/302796.   
74 John Samples, “Why the Government Should not Regulate Content Moderation of Social Media” (2019) Cato 
Institute Policy Analysis 865. 
75 Cf The Economist, “Mark Zuckerberg Says He Wants More Regulation for Facebook” (6 April 2019): 
https://www.economist.com/business/2019/04/06/mark-zuckerberg-says-he-wants-more-regulation-for-
facebook. 
76 See for instance Mark Zuckerberg, “Status Update – 13 November 2016” (13 November 2016): 
https://www.facebook.com/zuck/posts/10103253901916271; Jonathan Vanian, “Facebook CEO Mark 
Zuckerberg Admits “Huge Mistake” But Will Not Step Down” (4 April 2018): 
http://fortune.com/2018/04/04/facebook-mark-zuckerberg-data-cambridge-analytica/. 
77 Wired, “Twitter Releases New Policy on “Dehumanising Speech”” (25 September 2018): 
https://www.wired.com/story/twitter-dehumanizing-speech-policy/. 
78 See for instance Bloomberg, “YouTube Executives Ignored Warnings, Letting Toxic Videos Run Rampant” (2 
April 2019): https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2019-04-02/youtube-executives-ignored-warnings-
letting-toxic-videos-run-rampant. Active monitoring is, of course, only one step away from pre-emptive 
censorship and prior restraint. 
79 The Act to Improve Enforcement of the Law in Social Networks (12 July 2017):  
https://www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/Gesetzgebungsverfahren/Dokumente/NetzDG_engl.pdf?__blob=publicationF
ile&v=2.  
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to fines of up to 50 million Euros,80 a far cry from the hundreds of Euros the ECtHR is 
used to sanctioning for online hate speech.81  
 
30. Even France82 and the UK,83 long the bastions of laïcité and the right to offend 
respectively, want to adopt something similar in the face of rising anti-Semitism and 
Islamophobia expressed online. So too in countries outside Europe, such as India.84 And 
in the wake of the Christchurch shootings, Australia plans to fine intermediaries up to 
10% of the platform’s annual turnover if they do not remove violent material 
expeditiously.85 Indeed, so-called rights-conscious jurisdictions now have, or will soon 
have laws that are more severe as compared to jurisdictions such as Malaysia (where 
the maximum fine is around USD 120,000)86 and Russia (where the maximum fine is 
around USD 15,000).87  
 
31. Lest it be assumed that the situation is somehow different for liability for individuals – 
it is not. It is no longer uncommon for jurisdictions to provide for fines and 
imprisonment sentences to punish those that knowingly spread fake news and 
disinformation that are tantamount to hate speech. States such as Bangladesh,88 Egypt,89 
and Malaysia,90 which mete out both considerably hefty fines and imprisonment 
sentences to tackle the so-called spread of disinformation that compromises national 
stability and security, are no longer anomalous. In addition to Germany,91 UK92 also 
                                                 
80 Taylor Wessing, “Germany’s Network Enforcement Act and its Impact on Social Networks” (6 August 2018): 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=fb107efe-70ae-4e97-9913-5035aeeb518a. 
81 See for instance Delfi AS v Estonia App no 40287/98 (ECtHR, 16 June 2015) at paras 27–31. See also Reuters, 
“Turkey Fines Twitter for Failure to Remove “Terrorist Propaganda”: Official” (11 December 2015): 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-twitter-fine-idUSKBN0TU0NK20151211. 
82 Politico, “Macron Vows Measures to Tackle Online Hate Speech and Anti-Semitism”, (21 February 2019): 
https://www.politico.eu/article/macron-vows-measures-to-tackle-online-hate-speech-and-anti-semitism/. France 
already has laws dealing with fake news, but this is limited to the spread of misinformation during elections: 
Assemblee Nationale, “Dispositions Modifiant le Code Electoral” (20 November 2018): http://www.assemblee-
nationale.fr/15/ta/tap0190.pdf.  
83 HM Government, “Online Harms White Paper” (April 2019): 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/793360/Onlin
e_Harms_White_Paper.pdf. 
84 Forbes, “India’s New Rules to Govern Social Media Raise Fears of More Censorship” (22 January 2019): 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/meghabahree/2019/01/22/indias-new-rules-to-govern-social-media-raise-fears-of-
more-censorship/#5ed7cc106759. 
85 Attorney-General for Australia, “Tough New Laws to Protect Australians from Live-Streaming of Violent 
Crimes” (4 April 2019): https://www.attorneygeneral.gov.au/Media/Pages/Tough-New-Laws-to-protect-
Australians-from-Live-Streaming-of-Violent-Crimes.aspx. 
86 CLJ Law, “Anti-Fake News Bill 2018”: 
https://www.cljlaw.com/files/bills/pdf/2018/MY_FS_BIL_2018_06.pdf. 
87 CNN, “New Law Lets Russia Jail People Who “Disrespect” the Government Online” (7 March 2019): 
https://edition.cnn.com/2019/03/07/europe/russia-internet-law-intl/index.html. 
88 Forbes, “Bangladeshi Digital Security Act Draws Fire From EU” (28 September 2018): 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/emmawoollacott/2018/09/28/bangladeshi-digital-security-act-draws-fire-from-
eu/#1e1df4a60277. 
89 Associated Press, “Egypt Tightens Restrictions on Media, Social Networks” (20 March 2019): 
https://www.apnews.com/1540f1133267485db356db1e58db985b. 
90 CLJ Law, “Anti-Fake News Bill 2018”: 
https://www.cljlaw.com/files/bills/pdf/2018/MY_FS_BIL_2018_06.pdf. 
91 DW, “German Court Sentences Facebook User to Jail for Xenophobic Comments” (17 October 2016): 
https://www.dw.com/en/german-court-sentences-facebook-user-to-jail-for-xenophobic-comments/a-36069082. 
92 HM Government, “Online Harms White Paper” (April 2019): 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/793360/Onlin
e_Harms_White_Paper.pdf. 
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plans to imprison persons guilty of online disinformation campaigns, following the lead 
by the likes of Canada,93 Italy,94 and Kenya.95 These states clearly do not think 
intermediary responsibility diminishes individual responsibility. 
 
IV. WHERE SINGAPORE STANDS AND OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS TO 
IMPROVE OUR REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
 
32. If there was once a time that the exercise of freedom of expression online was to be 
freely celebrated for giving everyone a potentially powerful voice, that time has in our 
view passed. Whereas previous forms of ground-breaking mediums – be it the 
microphone, radio, broadcast television, or the internet – were eventually found not to 
have fundamentally altered the landscape for freedom of expression such as to warrant 
paradigm shifts in regulation, states now consider social media to be the genuine game-
changer (for the worse).  
 
33. This is reflected most obviously in how the interpretation of the ICCPR has changed 
drastically in the form of the new and emerging online hate speech laws we have just 
surveyed above; the internet and social media may be ubiquitous, but it has not resulted 
in a unified understanding of how best to regulate the problem both in terms of offence 
creation and the punishments that follow. Whereas the previous emphasis was on 
invoking article 19(3) of the ICCPR only in extreme scenarios, states have now in effect 
pivoted to using article 20(2) as the default starting point, complemented by the use of 
the margin of appreciation and contiguous international human rights obligations such 
as those found in ICERD.96 The Rabat Plan used for determining hate speech is also 
decidedly open-ended enough without drawing any bright lines – much will depend on 
the facts of each case and the circumstances of each jurisdiction, a situation no doubt 
complicated by the amplifying nature of social media. The composite picture that 
emerges from all of this is not one that is terribly reassuring for those looking to discern 
discrete rules of international law in this domain – and one has not even begun to discuss 
if a clear line can be drawn between incitement laws and anti-blasphemy laws, the latter 
of which has been condemned by the UN97 but can, in certain situations where 
statements about race or religion are made, be hardly distinguishable from the former. 
 
34. As far as Singapore is concerned, it has not ratified the ICCPR, and so it is not bound 
by it as a matter of treaty law.98 But given the very high ratification numbers,99 putting 
                                                 
93 Postmedia, “Convicted Hate-Monger Gets Added Jail Time for his Muslim-Offending “Social Experiment” (6 
January 2015): https://o.canada.com/news/blatchford-convicted-hate-mongerer-gets-added-jail-time-for-his-
muslim-offending-social-experiment. 
94 Washington Post, “A Man was Sentenced to 9 months in Prison. His Crime? Posting Fake Reviews on 
TripAdvisor” (12 September 2018): https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2018/09/12/man-tried-sell-fake-
tripadvisor-reviews-hes-going-prison-after-landmark-ruling-italy/?utm_term=.1ccc1d46566d. 
95 NPR, “Kenya’s Crackdown on Fake News Raises Questions About Press Freedom” (19 May 2018): 
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/05/19/612649393/kenyas-crackdown-on-fake-news-raises-
questions-about-press-freedom.  
96 See footnote 52. 
97 See UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, “Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance”, 
UN Doc A/72/365.   
98 Singapore also subscribes to the dualist approach to the domestic incorporation of international law: see 
generally Chen Siyuan, “The Relationship between International Law and Domestic Law” (2011) 23(1) SAcLJ 
350. 
99 The 19 states that have neither signed nor ratified do not include any major states. 
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aside issues of enforcement,100 there is some force in the claim that articles 19 and 20 
of the ICCPR have attained the status of customary international law.101 Yet even 
assuming the two articles bind Singapore, the aforementioned three-part test for 
justifying interferences with article 19 can probably be surmounted with some ease.  
 
35. Specifically, vague or broad as some of the POFMA provisions may be, the threshold 
for prescription for law has always been low and almost never successfully argued 
before international tribunals, and in any event, to the extent that the prescription 
requirement can be satisfied with safeguards,102 the minister’s decision can be judicially 
reviewed and would constitute such safeguards.103 On the next requirement, few would, 
or can, quibble with the suppression of online hate speech as fulfilling a pressing social 
need and constituting a legitimate aim, notwithstanding the aforesaid difficulties in 
identifying what might qualify as hate speech.104 But, also as mentioned, the Rabat Plan 
looks at multiple factors such that what may be hate speech in one place may not be 
hate speech in another – the factors of likelihood of harm, for instance, is going to be 
so context-sensitive. When viewed through an international lens that often minimises 
the review of domestic measures, this is not going to be an insurmountable hurdle. 
Lastly, the proportionality of the POFMA sanctions, be it for individuals or 
intermediaries, would likely be situated in the middle of the spectrum of punishments 
for online hate speech when compared to current and developing international norms 
across the board.105 And if the margin of appreciation does apply (at any given limb of 
the three-part test), this will only bolster Singapore’s position, considering its political 
history with respect to managing racial and religious relations.106  
 
36. Having said that, apart from the four issues we had previously highlighted and analysed, 
we do think the regulatory framework can be improved in the following ways in the 
light of what has been developing internationally. After all, given that international 
developments are now veering more towards the Singapore-style of governance for 
regulating online content, this is a rare opportunity for us to lead the way in setting 
standards. First, the current tenor of the POFMA may give the impression that, unlike 
the case for individual offenders who may already face punishment for posting hate 
speech online, intermediaries are better off waiting for the government to issue an order 
before acting to remove hate speech hosted on their platforms instead of adopting a 
more proactive stance in monitoring hate speech.  
 
                                                 
100 See UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, “Human Rights Bodies – Complaints Procedures”: 
https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/tbpetitions/pages/hrtbpetitions.aspx.  
101 The requisite elements are that of widespread and representative state practice and opinio juris: North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases, ICJ Reports 1969 at paras 73–77. 
102 Liu v Russia (no 2) App no 29157/09 (ECtHR, 26 July 2011) at para 88. 
103 Cf UN Human Rights Council, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right 
to Freedom of Opinion and Expression”, UN Doc A/HRC/38/35 (2018) at para 23.  
104 See generally Robert Faurisson v France UN Doc CCPR/C/58/D/550/1993 (HRC, 2 January 1993). 
105 Further, the assessment of whether the requirements of prescription by law, the existence of a pressing social 
need, and a proportionate response that has no less restrictive measures are met, must necessarily be conducted 
against the backdrop of the specific circumstances of a state and take into account the “specific need on which 
they are predicated”: UN Human Rights Committee, “General Comment 34” (12 September 2011) UN Doc 
CCPR/C/GC/34 at para 22. 
106 See also ECtHR, “Hate Speech Fact Sheet” (March 2019): 
https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/fs_hate_speech_eng.pdf. 
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37. While we have argued – as has the UN recently107 – that the government is better placed 
than intermediaries to determine what is online hate speech and that a government order 
is probably the most democratic option when it comes to this type of censorship,108 this 
should not leave the tools that intermediaries already have (filters, complaint 
mechanisms, moderators to enforce community standards, and so forth) without teeth. 
There would be situations in which intermediaries would, through their own 
mechanisms or otherwise, be put on notice about potentially problematic content – for 
instance, in the wake of a terrorist attack, or on the eve of elections. When this happens, 
intermediaries should work in concert with the authorities to decide on the best course 
of action, rather than revert to private censorship or do nothing at all. Preferably, 
however, any decision made this way should have some element of public access so 
that a hybrid form of private-public censorship does not ensue. If we look for example 
at Facebook’s recent mass-bans of American and British public figures, their decisions 
have not been based on facts but simply their own feelings and political preferences109 
– something which should not happen (at least not so easily) under the POFMA. 
 
38. Our second point is related to this: transparency in any decision-making remains 
important for public confidence in the system to be maintained. Indeed, a commentator 
has suggested that the POFMA should “require a Minister’s order to identify the 
relevant falsehood, set out what the true position is, identify the specific public interest 
involved and how it is threatened by the falsehood, and articulate why the order is both 
proportionate and necessary” and also “expressly require any order to be proportionate 
to the nature of the falsehood and the degree of harm to the public interest.”110  
 
39. The same commentator has also suggested that as a matter of practice, the government 
“should provide an annual summary of the Ministerial orders issued, the facts and 
circumstances of each case, the reasons for the specific Ministerial orders, the number 
of appeals … and the outcome of the appeals … This annual review would enable 
Parliament to decide if the law is properly achieving its stated legislative aims”.111 
Adopting these two suggestions does incur some costs and is not strictly required even 
by international standards, but we are broadly in agreement with the suggestions insofar 
as they promote transparency and Singapore continues to pride itself on being one of 
the most transparent countries in the world.112  
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 40. We do not think, however, as some commentators have suggested, that an additional 
layer of checks should exist in the form of an independent body.113 Expediency is key 
to the efficient (and cost-effective) operation of the POFMA, and a check already exists 
in the form of the courts. What is of greater importance is the accountability aspect. 
While the Ministry of Law has stated that the government’s reasons for each order will 
be guided by subsidiary legislation, it may be more prudent to build this into the primary 
legislation. Subsidiary legislation takes time to develop and does not have the same 
binding effect as primary legislation, and as pointed out by several Nominated Members 
of Parliament during the debate, can be more easily amended (in a negative sense) than 
primary legislation.114 Given the uncertainties over what would constitute online hate 
speech, requiring reasons to be given from the very first orders that are issued pursuant 
to the POFMA would provide important certainty and strengthen the rule of law. This 
certainly would help not just with regard to what constitutes an offence, but also why 
certain orders were made and considered proportionate (which is separate from the 
proportionality of the sanctions that flow from violating the orders). 
 
41. Finally, we foresee difficulties in justifying the inclusion of messaging services as 
intermediaries that would fall under the POFMA (whether in relation to online hate 
speech or otherwise). Under section 2, one of the examples given for what counts as an 
intermediary is “internet-based messaging services”; section 3 also confirms that 
material is considered to be communicated for the purposes of the POFMA so long as 
it is sent through the internet. However, messaging services are meant to facilitate 
private communications. In contrast, the whole point of posting on social media is to 
hope that the content goes viral – which is hard to achieve unless there is some publicity 
of the content, even if it is only being circulated within closed groups. Another 
difference between a messaging service and social media is that of reach. Even before 
recent changes to limit the forwarding of messages,115 apps like WhatsApp and 
Telegram just do not have the same design architecture and features as Facebook or 
Twitter to facilitate sharing of messages with the same scale.  
 
42. More importantly, there is also the issue of privacy. In pretty much any given case, how 
is one supposed to monitor what is being shared between users of messaging services 
without some sort of surveillance?116 This could explain why in countries where 
messaging services have been regulated for online hate speech, the governmental 
response has seldom deviated from a complete shutdown of those services.117 When 
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this was raised in Parliament, it was not stated how the government would be alerted of 
problematic content being shared through such services. Instead, the Senior Minister of 
State said that “in closed spaces, people are more susceptible to emotive falsehoods, 
because these are the spaces inhabited by the familiar and the trusted.”118 Of course, 
one of the ways to work around this is to have the messaging service prevent the sharing 
of certain websites or certain online articles. But this reintroduces the problems of 
private censorship, which on balance, is probably not desirable, even if the censorship 
is limited to reducing visibility and is based on user feedback.119 Ultimately, in deciding 
to include messaging services, one should bear in mind that the pursuit of security still 
needs to be tempered by some sense of proportionality and efficacy. This challenge 
may well be made more difficult as “deep fakes” become more prevalent, but that is 
something we would leave to for a future endeavour. 
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